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THE NORTHERN AREA OF NATO:
STATUS AND CHALLENGES

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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This study examines the status and challenges to the security of NATO'S Northern Area following the rapid and fundamental changes in the political, economic and military structures which Europe has experienced since 1989. Due to an exposed geostrategic position and the momentum of the European integration process, Norway faces the challenge of being partly isolated from the emerging security architecture. The study concludes that Norway should apply for membership in the EC/WEU, but continue to strongly support NATO's transatlantic link and primacy in a system of several interlocking security institutions. The study also concludes that future reduced national defense spending should give priority to North Norway and a force structure aimed at controlling the land territory, anti-invasion and air defence.

THE NORTHERN AREA OF NATO: STATUS AND CHALLENGES

INTRODUCTION

The rapid and fundamental changes in the political, economic and military structures which Europe has experienced since 1989, have basically altered the security equation and arrangements in the region. These changes, which will be fundamental for the emerging security architecture, include a multipolar system replacing a bipolar system, economic and political integration replacing military and ideological confrontation, and unpredictability more than stability.

The overall positive development in the European security situation will influence most nations and regions on the continent. In the Central Region - or the core - of Europe, where the confrontation and tension between East and West have been most tangible, a quite different security situation is emerging with emphasis on economic and political integration. Furthermore, centrifugal forces - such as mass migration - are influencing a shift of attention towards Southern - and Eastern Europe.

In the Northern area - or on the periphery - of NATO, however, the geostrategic factors remain basically unaltered. In addition, the Northern Area is on the periphery of the European integration process which represents a particular challenge to future security development in the area. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to examine the status and challenges to the security of NATO's Northern Area after the Cold War, CFE, and

break-down of the Soviet Union, and to outline some broad policy recommendations.

THE NORTHERN AREA OF NATO

General consideration

The Northern Area of NATO has been considered somehow to be an isolated flank, although the area for decades has been of fundamental strategic importance to Western Europe. Based on the unification of Germany, the Defense Planning Committee in NATO - on its meeting in December 1991 - decided the structure within Allied Command Europe should include three Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) responsible for the Southern, Central and Northwestern Regions.¹ Although work will continue to develop the detailed structure, the Northern Region (AFNORTH) as it is today - responsible for Norway, Denmark and the German area of Schleswig-Holstein, will be changed. AFNORTH will be replaced by a Northwestern MSC - AFNORTHWEST, most likely located at High Wycombe, North of London, responsible for Norway, the UK and surrounding waters. In the new NATO structure, therefore, Norway is clearly the Northern Area or sub-region, and this paper will accordingly focus on Norway.

Geography - the most constant factor in history

Norway is now experiencing the essence of the saying that geography is the most constant factor in history. Simply stated, Norway's geographic position is characterized by:

- Its 196 km long common border with the Russian Republic of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which lies less than 60 miles from major air and naval bases on the Kola Peninsula; with the only all-year, ice-free Russian ports available in the Western hemisphere.

- Its territory is superbly suited for surveillance, control and forward defense of the Kola military complex.

- It is situated on the shortest air-route between central parts of the U.S.A. and the Russian Republic of the CIS.

In addition to the strategic dimensions of the Northern Area, the Norwegian and the Barents Sea for decades have been the scene for conflicts over resources. The distribution of fishery resources in the Northern Area is an important domestic issue in Norway, also having a security dimension connected to the national policy of maintaining a pattern of population in the coastal and rural areas of North-Norway. Furthermore, the problems of fishery and agriculture, particularly in North-Norway, are the most difficult issues concerning participation in the overall European integration process.

The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 transfers the sovereignty of the Svalbard Islands to Norway. The former Soviet Union has for decades maintained a larger settlement on the island than the Norwegian mining community. According to the treaty the islands shall remain demilitarized. Nevertheless, disputes over the scope of Norwegian sovereignty of the islands, future exploration of petroleum resources and regulations of fisheries add another

dimension to a complicated pattern of interests in the Northern Area.

Norway and the former Soviet-Union have been negotiating for several years over the line of delineation on the Continental Shelf in the Barents Sea. The disputed area between the Median Line, claimed by Norway, and the Sector Line, claimed by the former Soviet Union, make up some 176,000 km². The disputed area, the so-called "Grey-Zone", is interesting both for its fishery, and future exploration of petroleum resources. The temporary agreement for the "Grey-Zone" has, since it was concluded in 1978, been extended several times, and it has taken the form of a semi-permanent arrangement. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that non-legal concerns have slowed the progress towards a permanent solution. The early Norwegian recognition of the Russian Republic, therefore, should be seen as an attempt to enhance good-will and provide momentum in the process of reaching a permanent agreement in the "Grey-Zone." The Russian Republic and Norway now have agreed to resume negotiations in April this year, and a possible compromise may be to establish a borderline in the middle between the sector - and the median line.

In 1989 a Japanese merchant vessel sailed from Hamburg in Europe to Osaka in Japan through the North-East passage in just 22 days. When using the traditional southern sea route through the Suez Canal this is normally done in 30 days.² If the Russian Republic or the CIS is able to develop this concept, the future may see increased traffic between Europe and the Pacific using

this sea-route, adding yet another dimension to the Northern Area.

Norwegian security policy.

Norwegian security policy has been based on two major principles: the safeguarding of its territory and reassurance in relation to neighboring countries. Due to its small population and large land area, Norway is heavily dependent upon NATO reinforcements, and is linked to the security arrangements in Europe, principally through NATO and the CSCE. Another major problem is, in a military context, the uneven distribution of the population and logistical resources. In times of crisis, North-Norway will be reinforced by forces from South-Norway - a distance which equals that to Italy. Therefore, in order to reduce the deployment time heavy weapons, equipment and ammunition have been prepositioned in North-Norway for national and NATO reinforcements.

For the policy of reassurance to neighboring countries certain unilateral political measures have been established to emphasize the defensive nature of Norwegian security policy. Such measures are:

- No foreign troops to be based permanently on Norwegian territory in peacetime.
- No nuclear warheads to be deployed to Norwegian territory in peacetime.
- Certain restrictions on allied exercises, particularly in the high North, Finnmark.

In the 1980's Norway maintained the NATO-goal of a 3.5% annual so-called "real-growth" in the defense budget. In the last three years the budget has been reduced to a so-called "0-growth" level. Studies conclude, however, that even a continuous "0-growth" budget is likely to have a strong negative impact on the defense capability estimated to some 40% reduction during the next 20 years.³ A consequence will be that a minimum and balanced national defense only can be maintained in certain high priority part(s) of the country.

The "Nordic Balance"

The present security structure in Nordic Europe reflects various geopolitical factors and lessons experienced by the Nordic countries during the Second World War. Since 1949 the so-called "Nordic Balance" has been an established and relatively static feature of the overall security system in Europe with Denmark, Iceland and Norway as NATO members, Sweden as neutral and Finland having a treaty of "Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" with the Soviet-Union. However, the situation of change in Europe - based primarily on economic and political integration - has also brought momentum into the Nordic area towards the center - or engine - of the momentum, the European Community.

Denmark is the Nordic country having the closest ties to Central Europe. Located on the European mainland and as a member of the EC, Denmark is already participating in the EC efforts aiming at economic, political and possibly military integration. Furthermore, Denmark as a NATO member has experienced a sharply

diminishing threat toward the Baltic Approaches due to the independence of the three Baltic states and the unification of Germany. In the new NATO command structure, Denmark is likely to become a part of the Central Region of NATO, and not as present a part (BALTAP) of the Northern Region (AFNORTH). The fact that Denmark under the CFE-treaty is a part of the expanded Central-European Region⁴ is another factor confirming that Denmark is more a natural part of the European mainland, and less a part of the former Northern Region.

The concept of neutrality has its origin from the time of power balance and bloc divisions. In a time of diminishing divisions and increasing integration, the policy of neutrality may even create a risk of isolation. This is a dilemma for Sweden today, as described by the Prime Minister, Carl Bildt: " . . . And it is difficult to say what one should be neutral against in the Europe where everybody wants to cooperate on the basis of freedom and democracy and a market economy. So the concept [of neutrality policy] is crumbling away, and that includes all the countries which have defined themselves as neutral . . . ".⁵ This is the background for Sweden's important decision to apply for membership in the EC where negotiations are likely to commence in 1992. However, in spite of this decision, Sweden still maintains that "military non-alignment is not crumbling away"⁶ and that the defense policy cooperation should be of an inter-state character.

Finland was in November 1991 in the process of finalizing a replacement of "The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" which existed with the former Soviet-Union. The 43-year-old previous treaty had the option of feared Soviet military consultation with Finland. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, Finland quickly switched to a Russian-Finnish treaty based on the principles of the UN charter and the CSCE resolution. When the new treaty is approved by the parliaments of both countries, there is no ban on Finland entering alliances. Presently, Finland - as an EFTA-member - is part of the agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) which will facilitate Finland's interests in the economic integration of Europe. However, the creation of the EEA will not only create possibilities, but also new challenges to Finland particularly when neutral EFTA-members such as Sweden and Austria have decided to seek membership in the EC. Furthermore, the Russian Republic may even regard Finnish membership in the EC as more of an advantage whereby Finland could become a bridge to the West.⁷

Norway and Iceland have also strengthened their ties to the EC through the EEA agreement. However, due to particular geostrategic factors, both countries are heavily dependent on NATO's ability to provide stability and assurance. Therefore, the necessity of maintaining a credible Atlantic Alliance and the momentum of the overall European integration process is creating a situation of cross-pressure and a difficult domestic dilemma, particularly in Norway.

The recent independence of the three Baltic States adds another dimension to the "Nordic Balance". Due to their location and history these states envision the Nordic countries as attractive models and special friends. The Baltic states do not - at the present time - consider the CSCE as a credible instrument of assurance.⁸ Hence the foreign ministers of the Baltic States participated in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council's December 91 meeting in Brussels, reaching an agreement on liaison, consultation and cooperation on political and security issues.⁹ The Baltic States and other former Soviet republics may, furthermore, revitalize the issue of a Nordic "nuclear-free zone" by declaring their territories as nuclear-free. Also the EC seems to be ready to build economic relations with the Baltic States which may hold the potential of developing into major centers of trade on the European continent based on the ports and land access to Northern and Eastern Europe.

The momentum of the overall European integration process has brought a similar momentum into the Nordic region. As described by the German Foreign Minister, Hans D. Genscher, . . . "I am quite sure that Sweden's example will not leave its neighbors in Northern Europe, Norway and Finland, unaffected and unimpressed".¹⁰ A part of this process is also likely to include an integration on foreign and security policy, changing the "Nordic Balance" as we know it today, to a future group with common values and interests within the European Community.

POST COLD WAR

The break-down of the former Soviet-Union is the latest in a series of events symbolizing the end of the Cold War. The disappearing threat challenges the role of NATO as the principal defender of Western Europe, as described by a commentator: "With that danger diminished to the vanishing point, NATO is already undergoing its own destruction, more subtle, dignified and gradual than that of the Warsaw Pact, but in the long run just as relentless."¹¹ The North Atlantic Treaty, however, does not identify any specific threat, and accordingly the preamble states that the parties "seek to promote stability and well-being" and unite efforts "for the preservation of peace and security."¹² This is the background for NATO over the years developing - not only to be a classical military alliance, but also to become a "political commonwealth of like-minded and equal nations which share common values and increasingly also common interests."¹³

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept - agreed by the Parties during the Rome Summit 7 Nov. 1991, acknowledges the fundamental change of the military balance in Europe and hence the need for NATO to transform accordingly. The Strategic Concept envisions a broad approach to security, realizing that "the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before".¹⁴ Although the political role of NATO is likely to be enhanced in the future, this role is based on the essential military component which is largely dependent on the U.S. commitment to the Alliance, today manifested by the

deployment of U.S. troops in Europe. Perhaps Sir Brian Kenny is correct when he says: "In some ways, the U.S. has replaced the Warsaw Pact as the glue of NATO!"¹⁵

NATO is also challenged by a more dynamic and confident EC which is increasing its efforts to reach an agreement on a political union which - according to the German Chancellor, H. Kohl, "is the indispensable counterweight to economic and monetary union".¹⁶ The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation recognizes that the new challenges only can be addressed "in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America".¹⁷ Furthermore, the Strategic Concept welcomes the development of the WEU as the defense component of the EC, contributing to strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance.

Although the disappearing specific "threat" may significantly reduce the military component of NATO, the alliance still provides the essential link for collective defense between North America and Western Europe. This link is of fundamental importance for Norway, and the transformation of NATO - such as strategic concept, role and force structure - provides a framework for a continued role of NATO as a principal security and defense institution in Europe. Furthermore, with a proven record of crisis-management, decision-making and projection of multinational military power NATO still has an important medium-term role as a stabilizing element overseeing the process of change and trust building, not only for Western Europe, but also for the former Warsaw Pact countries.

POST CFE

The CFE Treaty is expected - through a significant reduction of forces and level of tension in Central Europe - to increase stability in Europe at large. The CFE negotiations have, however, by the arrangements of categories of forces and equipment, been particularly focused on the Central Region of Europe. The implications of the CFE is therefore likely to be slightly different for the flanks of NATO generally, and Norway especially, than for the Central Region.

The huge naval and air assets on the Kola Peninsula are not fully integrated into the CFE, and the shadow of this significant military potential will continue to create uncertainty. The initial Soviet attempt to transfer air and ground forces to categories not included in the treaty further emphasized this uncertainty and the difference between the Central and Northern Area. The movement of a great amount of equipment east of the Urals and the discrepancies in the Soviet data provided were other concerns. However, according to the U.S. Secretary of state, James Baker: "Discrepancies between our data and the Soviet data provided at signature have been narrowed considerably . . . In our view none of these data issues warrant delays in acting on the treaty."¹⁸

Although special arrangements have been granted to the former Soviet Union, now the CIS, for storage of hundreds of MBT's, guns and APC's in the Northern Flank Zone¹⁹, the treaty is likely to include a significant reduction of offensive equipment in the zone, which pose limitations for a possible use of the

Leningrad Military District as a more important staging and storage area. Under the assumption that the distribution between the military districts of the 6 republics in the flank zone is not changing, the reduction in the Leningrad Military District may include some 20-55% of the TLE.²⁰

A principle of fundamental importance to Norway - the integration of the Northern Area into the overall security arrangement in Europe, is included in the CFE Treaty. The Russian Republic will continue to have an overwhelming local military superiority, but the threat defined as an interaction of geostrategic factors, capability and intention is significantly reduced. The reduction of standing forces, however, increases the importance of reinforcements. This is accommodated in the CFE Treaty by the introduction of short-term, notifiable supplements to the maximum figures which will facilitate the need for allied exercises and reinforcements in the Northern Area.²¹

The reductions that Norway has to undertake to comply with the CFE Treaty are marginal²², emphasizing the characteristics of a minimum defense. Within NATO a certain redistribution of equipment is expected to take place to ensure optional standardized and quality equipment. For Norway this represents an opportunity to update important equipment such as MRT's, APC's and possibly attack helicopters.

The declared intentions to establish separate armies in the republics of the CIS and the disagreement concerning the organization of the armed forces, may complicate the implementation of the CFE Treaty. However, the present economic situation is likely to further enhance the arms reduction

process, and an early ratification of the CFE will constitute an important step for the emerging security arrangement in Europe. The CFE Treaty is expected to be followed by further negotiations particularly aimed at limitations of personnel, measures of stabilization and the "open skies" policy. Of special importance to the Northwestern Region is the process of restructuring, modernization and deployment of forces on the Kola Peninsula which is also affected by the split over the armed forces organization following the Soviet Union breakdown.

POST SOVIET UNION BREAKDOWN

In spite of the foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the absence of credible central authority and power is creating serious concerns in the Western World. Although the breakdown of the Soviet Union also offers historic opportunities in a period of transition, it does indeed have the potential for grave consequences both within the former union and for the surrounding countries. As George Kennan describes the potential: "Experience has shown that any major change in the composition of the international community, although perhaps unavoidable or even desirable over the long term, is pregnant with possibilities for unpredictable complications and for grave dangers if it takes place too abruptly and without careful preparation."²³

The most serious concern - the command and control of some 30,000 nuclear warheads and possible nuclear proliferation - has been addressed in the timely and constructive proposal from President G. Bush on reducing U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Weapons.

The reactions from the former Soviet Union - now the CIS - indicates a positive development also in fields of particular interest to the Northern Area such as naval disarmament and destruction of short-range nuclear weapons.

The CIS - or the Russian Republic - continues to control a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying the USA within hours. However, the deteriorating status of its strategic nuclear forces is reducing that "threat" towards the USA to a minimum. Furthermore, the Russian President Boris Yeltzin has stated that the targeting of U.S. cities has stopped due to the fact that the CIS does not consider the U.S. as an enemy. This development may also have a future impact on the Northern Area where the major part of the Russian second strike capability - the SSBN's - is located.

The putsch of August 1991 represented a final window of opportunity for the independence of the three Baltic States. As a consequence of this development the CIS - by the latest in the mid 1990's - has to remove or vacate a number of important military facilities from the Baltic States. The present struggle over the organization of the armed forces - particularly the Black Sea fleet - may result in a similar split and relocation of important military resources. The most likely area of relocation for personnel and equipment from the Baltics and Ukraine is Leningrad Military District which further will increase its military potential and importance. The Northern Fleet will hence continue to be a most modern and capable striking power, and its

future operational pattern will serve as an indicator of the Russian ambition and purpose as a regional power.

SECURITY CONCERNS

The problems facing the CIS indicate that this loosely organized element is likely to be another step in the process of creating several "fully" independent republics, some of them even with a nuclear arsenal. The Russian Republic - or in a possible federation with some of the Slavic core neighbouring republics - will continue to be a major military power on the European Continent. However, the economic situation and continued domestic turmoil sharply reduce its present ability of power projection. In addition, the collapse of communism - as an anti-Western ideology - favors a change in Russian attitude and purpose towards the Western World.

The former regimes in Central and Eastern Europe were able - by harsh military means - to suppress ethnic motions and nationalism. The new democracies have inherited these problems, creating vulnerabilities which may result in a failure to pass the litmus test of combining democracy and nationalism in a difficult time of transition. The present civil war in Yugoslavia demonstrates the problems of ethnic motions/nationalism, and the inherent difficulties in preventing or controlling such a conflict. The pattern of ethnic group does not follow national borders, representing a potential of cross-border conflict on a larger scale since civil wars are internationalized by the intervention of outside states.

The breakdown of the former Soviet Union may result in expulsion of ethnic Russians from other republics - such as the Baltics, further developing the existing Russian nationalism which for centuries has been a factor in expansionism. In the 1991 Russian presidential election the leader of Russia's ultranationalists - V. Zhirinovskiy - came in third, winning more than 6 million votes. According to the nationalist leader, the former borders of the czarist area should be restored, new spheres of influence should be established and Russia's natural route of expansion is to the South.²⁴ Furthermore, Russian nationalism combined with domestic turmoil created by deep economic and social problems may fuel the search for "a strong man" and return to a totalitarian regime.

The Gulf-crisis clearly demonstrated that vital European interests also may be at stake outside the continent. A number of challenges to the overall European security may derive from the increasing interdependence in the political and economic structures of the world. Such challenges described by NATO as multi-faceted, multidirectional and unpredictable, may be revealed as conflicts over territorial claims, natural resources, religion or demographic pressure. These centrifugal forces are mostly located close to Southern - and Eastern Europe, and they would all have the potential for generating hostilities on a grand scale and for international involvement. The shift of attention to these areas may further marginalize and isolate the Northern Area of NATO.

A broader definition of security concerns is also likely to identify more potential problems in the Northern Area, particularly in the field of environment. The nuclear testing at Novaja Zemly is now temporally halted; but the safety conditions at nuclear plants, submarines and nuclear waste depots are matters of great concern for the inhabitants of the Northern Area. The enormous pollution from the Kola industrial complex is not only causing problems to the population of Kola itself, but is seriously effecting both Norway and Finland.²⁵ A joint Finnish-Norwegian proposal - offering some \$100 million to the Russian Republic - to reduce the pollution has recently been turned down, creating strong reactions particularly in North Norway. The latest revelation of likely dumping of some ten thousand of barrels of nuclear waste into the Barents Sea has further strengthened the Norwegian concern in the field of environment.

HOW TO MEET THE SECURITY CHALLENGES TO THE NORTHERN AREA

General

The essence of a statement by former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, has been acknowledged by most Norwegians: "Clearly no nation is strong enough to keep its own freedom. Every nation requires alliances, friendships or associations of one kind or another with other countries who share its goals and ideas"²⁶. However, Norway today faces a situation where the geostrategic factors seemed to be reduced as elements in a new security architecture and overtaken by a

European integration process promoted by the EC. For Norway, therefore, the main security challenges are:

- to maintain a credible transatlantic multinational alliance (NATO) for a collective defense of North America and Western Europe
- to link the Northern Area to the emerging security architecture in Europe
- to maintain a credible national defense to exercise sovereignty.

The Northern Area and NATO

When using Clausewitz's "center of gravity"²⁷ in analyzing the Russian Republic, three possible "hubs of power" can be identified:

- The nuclear capability, particularly the SSBN's (mostly strategic level),
- The Northern Fleet (operational level)
- The Russian People/National will (strategic level)

The major U.S. interest in the Northern Areas has been the SSBN's (second strike capability), but the Russian Republic - at the present time - does not have the ideological framework to continue a policy of competition or confrontation with the Western World in general and the U.S. in particular. The reported collision between a U.S. and a Russian submarine in the Barents Sea indicates that the U.S. is still keeping a close watch on the SSBN's. However, the improving relations between the two countries and the economic problems may lead to further

significant reductions in nuclear weapons followed by a reduced U.S. interest and operational presence in the Northern Area.

The Northern Fleet has continued its modernization and expansion to become the most modern and capable striking power of the former Soviet Union's fleets. The main tasks of the Northern Fleet are presumed to be:

- protection of the SSBN's
- forward defense in the Norwegian Sea
- severing the SLOC's between North America and Western Europe

Although it may be premature to predict the influence of change on these tasks, the present economic problems and the operational pattern indicate a more regional defensive posture and less an ambition of global naval power projection. The U.S. Navy has had a particular important role in NATO's capability of balancing the Northern Fleet. The most important allied reinforcements - naval and air forces - are mostly U.S. which is also the only western nation having a credible strategic lift capability. However, the experience from exercise "Team Work 90" and "Battle Griffin 91"²⁸ signals that allied reinforcements in the future will be less in number and availability. This trend may be further strengthened by the downsizing of the U.S. force structure and reduced interest simplified by a "No nuke - No problem" attitude. Since the U.S. is the only nation having the capability to balance the Russian forces in the Northern Area such a development may create a vacuum which - history shows, is likely to be filled by other powers in due course.

In this situation it is of vital importance for Norway that the deterrent function of NATO - which successfully has provided

peace and stability in the region for more than 40 years - still remains as an important task. This requirement is accommodated in the New Strategic Concept which includes as a fundamental security task "to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any member state."²⁹

The new force structure will also expand the multinational character of NATO's force. In this process Norway should participate to strengthen the credibility of NATO's concept, not only with naval units, but when possible with army and air force units. Furthermore, Norway should be actively involved in the NATO process of confidence-building and humanitarian relief to a most important "center of gravity" - The Russian People. In addition, NATO may have an important function of educating Russian or CIS officers - today maybe one of the few stabilizing elements in the former Soviet Union - in the role and functions of the military in a democracy. However, the requirement to open for Russian participation in the European integration process is - for the foreseeable future - not likely to go through NATO, but rather the CSCE, the EC and other regional institutions.

The Northern Area and the WEU/EC

The EC approach to security has mainly been based on economic and political integration, and less on the military dimension. Although the EC is struggling with serious domestic issues and the friction of widening versus deepening the integration process, the EC has managed to offer significant assistance programs to the countries in Eastern Europe. In a difficult period of transition, the EC initiatives take advantage of the historic opportunity and requirement to open for Eastern

European participation in the overall European integration process. For Norway this development presents a particular opportunity to further support the process of influencing the important strategic "center of gravity" - the Russian people or National will. Consequently, Norway should coordinate its humanitarian aid and other assistance programs with the EC in order to promote a stable and democratic development.

However, the EC has realized, as stated by the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, that "A united Europe is not possible in the long term without a common European defense."³⁰ The WEU is now identified to be the emerging defense component of the European integration process, and is therefore instrumental in the future process of strengthening NATO by increasing the European role and responsibility. One idea presently being discussed is some sort of arrangement attaching WEU-forces to NATO which may Atlanticize the EC and Europeanize NATO. Although the proposal of dual roles raises difficult principal and practical questions which have to be addressed, Norway has to realize that not being a full member of the WEU may isolate the Northern Area from parts of the emerging European security architecture.

The key to full participation in the WEU is Norwegian membership in the EC. The advantages in the fields of security and defense which a Norwegian membership in the EC offers, nevertheless, have been overshadowed by factors such as economics, sovereignty issues and district politics. However, Prime Minister Gro H. Brundtland recently signalled that - based

on the question of security policy - a full Norwegian participation in the WEU/EC is preferable.³¹ Furthermore, the Defense Commission of 1990 is expected to underline this point of view by recommending Norwegian membership in the EC.³²

By fully integrating the Northern Area into the emerging European security architecture other important issues having security aspects may be addressed in the overall European political framework. These aspects have made progress in areas such as distribution of natural resources, environment and trade slow and cumbersome. The Soviets - now Russians - have continuously searched for special bilateral agreements within the Northern Area which in due course would have constituted an uneven and exposed arrangement for Norway. However, dealing with the Russian Republic within the framework of the European integration process may promote the development of constructive and timely negotiations.

Norway is moreover becoming an important supplier of natural gas to the European Continent, particularly Germany, France and the UK. Currently this supply comes from the North Sea, but Statoil has confirmed exploitable findings of oil and natural gas North of the Arctic Circle. (see map attached) The northward movement of oil and natural gas production may over time develop closer security ties and interests between the Northern Area and the EC, also calling for a permanent agreement on the "Grey Zone". Furthermore, if the Russian Republic in the future is able to develop and maintain the use of the North-East passage,

this traffic may further promote European interests for the Northern Area.

When entering the EC and its defense component - the WEU - Norway should, nevertheless, realize the insufficiencies of these organizations and continue to emphasize NATO's primacy concerning security and defense. The WEU has not - at the present time - an organizational framework capable of sustained power projection, and it will be increasingly difficult to establish a credible military component in times of decreasing resources. Furthermore, the French-German proposal on a common European Army is more a symbol or vision than military reality³³, and it presently lacks joint capabilities, naval, air and strategic lift to institute a credible independent alternative to NATO. The WEU may also in the future be the NATO or EC vehicle for "out-of-area" operations which will pose political and constitutional problems for Norway.

The CSCE

The CSCE has the vision of an all-European collective security system overarching several interlocking security institutions. Due to the lack of an institutional framework, however, the CSCE provides more of a supplement heavily dependent upon NATO as an element of stability and assurance. Hence the CSCE ability to promote the peace-process does not equal its ability to guarantee and enforce security if negotiations fail and a crisis occurs. The CSCE - as a process - has been an important element in a period of transition. For the NATO-countries the CSCE - supported by some institutional framework -

may continue to play a vital role in preserving peace by facilitating consultations, cooperation and possible settlement of disputes.

National defense and security policy

A credible defense capability as a basis for exercising national sovereignty has been fundamental for Norwegian long term security policy. The purpose of this defense may - in broad terms - be described as Clausewitz did: " . . . to keep his [the defender] territory inviolate and to hold it for as long time as possible."³⁴ One of the problems facing Norwegian security policy - as that of NATO - is the diminishing specific military threat such as the former Soviet-Union. However, the German invasion of Norway in 1940 illustrates that not having a clearly defined enemy does not exclude military aggressions when geostrategic or other important factors are decisive. Hence the future national security policy should adopt to a broader concept of defense "against unspecified military risks in an unsafe world"³⁵, realizing that the Northern Area is a likely exposed and vulnerable location.

This concept should furthermore analyze and establish the purpose of the so-called "minimum-defense". Due to the enormous imbalance of military power in the Northern Area this "minimum defense" never had the capability to balance the specific former Soviet threat, but constituted a part of a deterrence against initial attack relying on NATO reinforcements to stop and defeat the invader. Consequently, as the availability of reinforcements is decreasing, Norway may face the situation of providing

relatively more resources to a smaller overall NATO defensive capability.

The Norwegian force structure has been based mostly on specific threat scenarios. In a period of reduced defense resources the national security authorities have to make a cost-risk estimate in which the low risk-high cost scenario may be replaced by a low risk-low cost scenario. Furthermore, the threat-based approach is likely to be replaced by a combined approach of fiscal austerity and hedging; more accommodating the search for flexibility and the budget-resource constraints. Particularly the fiscal approach will satisfy the desire to identify the so-called "peace-dividend" in economic terms, overlooking that "the peace-dividend" to the exposed Northern Area has been low tension and peace through deterrence. The fiscal approach to the defense policy also has mostly concentrated on the cost of the tool (defense capability) by using fiscal terms such as "real-growth" and "0-growth" budgets. Besides the fact that "real-growth" may not be growth and "0-growth" is a decrease, this terminology overshadows the more important discussion on the purpose and capability of the tool.

Due to the geographical distribution of resources, peacetime cost-effectivity, and defensive needs the priority between North and South Norway continues to pose a Norwegian dilemma. The new security situation in the Central Region and the Baltics, however, should clearly lead to the conclusion that South Norway has become less exposed. This development, therefore, should conclude in a concentration of efforts in North-Norway for most categories of forces. Although this priority may be more costly,

it will simultaneously facilitate the most important peace-time task: training in a demanding climatic environment, and familiarizing the units in the most likely area of operation. However, the difference between a "minimum defense" and a "symbolic defense" should carefully be considered when providing resources to South Norway.

The new force structure for NATO - rapid reaction, main defense and augmentation forces - is easily adoptable for Norway, or even already in place. However, the new NATO command structure provides an opportunity for seriously considering having only one Principal Subordinate Command in Norway - COMNOR - instead of two as today, preferably located in Bodoe or Oslo (now AFNORTH). The future development of the C³I-systems and the decrease in deployable military assets would further facilitate this more cost-effective alternative.

According to Denis Healy: "The military tend to concentrate on capability. The politicians should concentrate on intentions."³⁶ Today, the euphoria from 1989 has been replaced by a feeling more of realism, uncertainty and unpredictability due to the large Russian forces stationed in the Northern Area, further strengthened by the deployment of forces from the Ukraine and Baltic Republics. In spite of the deteriorating status of the CIS strategic forces, the regional naval, air and ground forces in the Northern Area have been modernized, increasing their capability.³⁷ The economic problems are likely to significantly reduce short-term defense spendings, but the remaining forces are still quite capable of posing a shadow of uncertainty in the Northern Area. The present operational pattern, however, indicates that the Northern Fleet mainly is

responsible for protecting the SSBN's by establishing a forward defense. But this forward defense would significantly benefit by including parts of Norwegian territory - such as Finnmark - which only can be obtained by the ground forces.

The strategy of defending the Northern Area, therefore, should concentrate on controlling the land territory in North Norway. Based upon the force structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces and the allied reinforcement, the national defense should give priority to ground forces supported by the navy and air force providing an anti-invasion capability and air defense. A pattern of labour division and specialization is likely to further develop within NATO and the WEU emphasizing the Norwegian relative dependence of allied air and naval reinforcements. The creation of multinational formations, furthermore, requires a reliable command structure, strategic lift and reception infrastructure, and a satisfactory training frequency to be credible as military means to achieve political ends.

The Chairman of the 1990 Defense Commission, Kaare Willoch, has described the Norwegian Defense as larger than necessary, but less capable than acceptable³⁸, and he also points out the disproportion between ambitions and allocation of resources. Factors further supporting this description are the time consuming, political decision-making process and the impact of district politics. Without timely and major reorganizations being accomplished the cuts will unnecessarily reduce the quality and size of the force production capability (the active component) and the quality of training and equipment of the reserve component.

CONCLUSION

Due to an exposed geostrategic position and at the same time being on the periphery of the European integration process, Norway faces the challenge of being partly isolated from the momentum of change in Europe. In order to meet this challenge Norway should apply for membership in the EC/WEU which will provide full participation in the European integration process and the emerging security architecture. However, Norway should continue to strongly support NATO's primacy in a system of several interlocking security institutions due to the vital transatlantic link and NATO's credibility as a stabilizing element with a proven record of crisis-management and deterrence. Furthermore, the WEU presently does not have a credible capability of sustained power projection, and consequently is not able to fill a vacuum in the Northern Area created by a possible reduced U.S. interest and operational presence.

Whatever alliances Norway is participating in, a national defense is instrumental in safeguarding its own sovereignty and freedom. Although 66% of the population supports the present or increased level of defense spendings³⁰, the future is likely to see major reorganizations which seriously reduce the national defense capability. A concentration of efforts is needed to maintain a minimum defense in the most likely exposed part of the country which implies priority to North Norway for most categories of forces. The future Norwegian force structure should give priority to forces aimed at controlling the most important land territory, anti-invasion capability and air

defense. This force structure may also be supported by an increased labour division and specialization within NATO and the WEU, providing crucial allied naval and air reinforcements. However, with a decreasing availability of allied reinforcement, Norway may face the situation of providing relatively more resources to a smaller overall NATO capability.

Endnotes

1. Final Communique, The Defense Planning Committee of NATO, 13 Dec. 1991, p. 3.
2. Jacob Børressen, De nordlige havomraader i en ny dimension, Atlanterhavskomiteens serier no. 141, p. 26.
3. Torolf Rein, Norsk forsvarspolitik tre år mot år 2000, Atlanterhavskomiteens serier No. 142, p. 10
4. ED Informasjon, No. 11, Nov. 1990, p. 44.
5. Interview on Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network, 20 Oct. 1991, FBIS, WEU-91-205 23 Oct. 1991, pp. 34-35.
6. Ibid., p. 35.
7. "Burbulis [Russian Deputy Prime Minister] indeed stressed the fact that Russia hoped that Finland would become a bridge to the West for it. The possibility that Finland may join the EC would at the present time appear to be more of a benefit for than a threat to Russia." The Finnish newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 1 Jan 92, p. 2: FBIS-WEU-92-034, 20 Feb. 91, p. 37.
8. In an interview in the Norwegian Newspaper "Aftenposten", a Norwegian Member of Parliament, J. Godal quotes the Lithuanian Chief of Defence that "the CSCE is not enough" and "Vilnius is searching toward a future Western security arrangement", Telexnytt 18991.
9. Press Communique, North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 20 Dec. 1991, pp. 1-3.

10. Berlin ADN, 7 Nov. 91. FBIS-WEU-91-215, 6 Nov. 91, p. 10.
11. Strobe Talbott, "Defusing the German Bomb", Time, 2 Jul 1990, p. 34.
12. Preamble. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C. 4 April 1949.
13. Manfred Woerner, "Atlanterhavsalliansen i en ny Era", ED-Informasjon no. 4 - April 1991, p. 49.
14. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 7 Nov 1991 p. 6.
15. Brian Kenny, "A NATO Vehicle to the Road Ahead", Parameters. USAWC Quarterly, VOL XXI No. 3, Autumn 1991, p. 25.
16. Paris AFB 14 Nov. 91, FBIS-WEU-91-220 14 Nov. 1991, p. 12.
17. Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, 8 Nov 1991, p. 1.
18. James Baker, "CFE: Foundation for Enduring European Security", European Affairs, Nov. 1991, p. 8.
19. 600 MBT's, 400 Guns, and 800 APC's according to ED-INFORMASJON, NO. 11, Nov. 1990, p. 50.
20. Vaart Vern, No. 4, Aug 1991, p. 17.
21. Article V of the CFE Treaty, ED-INFORMASJON, No. 11, Nov. 1990, p. 38.
22. The figures are: 35 MBT's, 5 guns, 12 HAVC's. Ibid. p. 61.
23. George Kennan: "Communism in Russian History:", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/91, reprinted in USAWC, Volume III Course 2, War, National Policy and Strategy, pp. 214-215.

24. Interview with the Norwegian daily Aftenposten, 4 Nov 91, FBIS-SOV-91-221, 15 Nov. 1991, pp. 64-66.

25. A study on environmental protection done by FORUT describes a serious environmental deterioration in an expanse encompassing 780 km² of the Norwegian Border area. The area studied had a maximum capacity of 1860 reindeer on the winter range in 1973, but by 1988 this capacity had been reduced to only 210 reindeer. The respective summer capacities were 1140 and 800.

Johnny Skorve, The Kola Satellite Image Atlas, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Oslo 1991, p. 125.

26. Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, Warner Brooks 1990, pp. 429-430.

27. "Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed".

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, eds. M. Howard and P. Paret, pp. 595-96.

28. Due to the Desert Shield/Desert Storm campaign the U.S. cancelled the participation of a U.S. MEB in Exercise "Team Work 1990" in Trondelag, and participated with a significantly reduced MEB (reserve) in Exercise "Battle Griffin 1991" which was exercising the Norwegian Airlanded MEB concept.

29. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, p. 6.

30. Interview in the French daily FIGARO, 14 Nov 1991, FBIS-WEU-91-220 14 Nov. 1991, p. 12.

31. Forsvarets Forum, no. 3, 29 Jan. 1992, p. 6.
32. Telexnytt No. 6/92, 9 Jan 1992.
33. The lack of a common language of command and standards of equipment has raised criticism, and is addressed in an article by Michael I. Inacker, Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 25 Oct. 1991, FBIS-WEU-91-228, 26 Nov. 1991, pp. 10-12.
34. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, G. Howard and P. Paret, eds., p. 614.
35. Fact Sheet, The Defense Budget 1992-1, MOD NORWAY No. 04/91, Oct 1991, p. 20.
36. John Leech, Halt Who Goes Where, Brassey's (UK) 1991, p. 114.
37. The air force of the Northern Fleet has been strengthened by two additional regiments of BACKFIRE's (medium range bombers). In 1991, BLACKJACK's (strategic bombers) were observed in the Norwegian Sea, and the air force has also been augmented by a regiment of FLOGGER's and one regiment of FROGFOOT's.

The land forces have been modernized, increasing their combat capability and vertical lift mobility. The Division North model is tailored to meet the northern terrain and climate by reducing the heavy armoured and artillery elements. The 77th coastal Defense Division (a former MID) is a heavy and capable force; one armor battalion is deployed in the Petchenga Area where the Naval Infantry Brigade(s) is deployed - a close distance from the Norwegian border.

The Northern Fleet has been expanded and modernized by deployment of a number of new surface vessels, such as the carrier BAKU, the nuclear cruiser KALININ, a SLAVA-class cruiser, seven destroyers and a large number of frigates, and most lately - 7 Dec. 1991 - with the air craft carrier Admiral KUTZNETSOV. In addition the amphibious capability is increasing by deployment of a large landing craft.

Also the submarine forces have been modernized and expanded by some 20 new submarines of various classes.

Fact Sheet. The Defense Budget 1992-1 MOD NORWAY no. 04/91, Oct 1991, pp. 21-24.


38. Interview in Dagbladet, Telexnytt no 247/91, 11 Dec 1991.


39. Telexnytt, no 14/92 21 Jan 1992.

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5. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, (FBIS) Western Europe - 91-205, 23 Oct 1991.
6. FBIS. WEU-91-215, 6 Nov. 1991.
7. FBIS. WEU-91-220, 14 Nov 1991.
8. FBIS. SOV - 91-221, 15 Nov 1991.
9. FBIS. WEU-91-228, 26 Nov 1991.
10. FBIS. WEU-92-034, 20 Feb 1992.
11. FD-Information no. 4, Apr 1991.
12. FD-Information no. 11, Nov 1990.
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189/91.
24. Telexnytt, No. 247/91.
25. Telexnytt, No. 6/92.
26. Telexnytt, No. 14/92.
27. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept.
28. Press Communique S-1(91)85, 7 Nov 1991.
29. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4 Apr 1949.
30. Vaart Vern, No. 4, Aug 1991.
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OSLO

STAVANGER

SLEIPNER

COD
TOMMELITEN

ULA
GYDA
EKOFISK
VALHALL
HOD

Gas Fields ●
Combined Gas/Oil Fields ●

Map showing
Norway's gas fields
and combined oil/gas
fields. Gas is shown
as red, oil as green.
The arrows indicate
main export routes
for natural gas from
the Norwegian sector.